Social Structure of China

China, the world's largest society, is united by a set of values and institutions that pass across extensive linguistic, environmental and sub cultural differences. Residents of the southern and northern regions of the country might not understand each other's speech, enjoy each other's favorite foods, or make a living on each other's land, and they might describe each other with derogatory stereotypes. Nonetheless, they would regard each other as fellow Chinese, members of the same society, different from the Vietnamese or Koreans, with whom some Chinese might seem to have more in common. Chinese society, since the second decade of the twentieth century, has been the object of a revolution that is intended to change in fundamental ways. In its more radical phases, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the revolution aimed at nothing less than the complete transformation of everything from the practice of medicine, to higher education, to family life. In the 1980s China's leaders and intellectuals considered the revolution far from completed, and they intended further social change to make China a fully modernized country. It had become increasingly clear that although many aspects of Chinese social life had indeed undergone fundamental changes because of both political movements and economic development, the transformation was less than total. Much of the past either lived on in modified form or served to shape revolutionary initiatives or to limit the choices open to even the most radical of revolutionaries.

Chinese Traditional Social Structure

Throughout the centuries, some 80 to 90 percent of Chinese have been farmers. The farmers supported a small number of specialized craftsmen and traders and also an even smaller number of land- and office-holding elite families who ran the society. Although the peasant farmers and their families resembled their counterparts in other societies, the traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry, had no peers in other societies. The national elite, who comprised perhaps 1 percent of China's population, had a number of distinctive features. They were dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles.

They achieved their highest and most prestigious titles by their performance on the central government's triennial civil service examinations. These titles had to be earned by each generation, and since the examinations had strict numerical quotas, competition was fierce. Government officials were selected from those who passed the examinations, which tested for mastery of the Confucian Classics. Elite families, like everyone else in China, practiced divisible inheritance, dividing the estate equally among all sons. The combination of divisible inheritance and the competition for success in the examinations meant that rates of mobility into and out of the elite were relatively high for a traditional agrarian society. The imperial state was staffed by a small civil bureaucracy. Civil officials were directly appointed and paid by the emperor and had to have passed the civil service examinations. Officials, who were supposed to owe their primary loyalty to the emperor, did not serve in their home provinces and were generally assigned to different places for each tour of duty. Although the salary of central officials was low, the positions offered great opportunities for personal enrichment, which was one reason that families competed so fiercely to pass the examinations and then obtain an appointment. For most officials, office holding was not a lifetime career. They served one or a few tours and then returned to their home districts and families, where their wealth, prestige, and network of official contacts made them dominant figures on the local scene.

China Regional Distinctions 

Regional distinctions in ways of life and standards of living were marked in traditional China and continue to have a strong influence on contemporary Chinese society. China's size, poorly developed transportation system, and state controls on migration mean that regional differences in income and in life chances remain large. Contemporary Chinese commentary, while certainly explicit on the role of class, has tended to ignore regional variation. This may reflect the characteristic emphasis on Chinese unity and uniformity, as well as the difficulty of fitting regional analysis into a Marxist framework. Nevertheless, both geographical position and a community's position in administrative and regional hierarchies act to limit income from sideline occupations, cash crops, village industries, and even such matters as marriage choices.

Incomes and educational standards in the 1980s were highest in the productive lower Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) Valley and central Guangdong Province regions and lowest in the semi-arid highlands of the northwest and the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, as they had been since the late nineteenth century. The lowest incomes and living standards were in the peripheral areas inhabited by minority nationalities. Within all regions, there were distinctions between urban cores, intermediate areas, and peripheries. Villages on the outskirts of major cities had more opportunities for production of cash crops such as vegetables, more opportunities in sideline occupations or subcontracting for urban factories, and easier access to urban services and amenities. Higher village incomes were reflected in better housing, higher school attendance, well-appointed village meeting halls, and a high level of farm and domestic mechanization. For settlements on the periphery, however, even if only a short distance from urban centers, transportation was difficult. Such settlements had changed little in appearance since the 1950s and devoted most of their land and work force to growing staple grains. Many children in these villages dropped out of school before completing primary education, as physical strength and endurance were more highly regarded than book learning.

There is clearly a degree of overlap in the four fields of social differentiation (work units, party membership, urban-rural distinctions, and regional distinctions). The top of the hierarchy is occupied by those who work in state organizations, belong to the party, live in a major city, and inhabit a prosperous region. Correspondingly, the least favored inhabitants are peasants whose villages are located in the remote parts of poor regions. What is most impressive about social differentiation in modern China is the extent to which key variables such as region and rural or urban status are ascribed, and not easily changed by individual effort. This is the negative side of the security and stability that attracted China's populace to the party and its programs.

The social structure of China has a very long history, going from the feudal society of imperial times to the industrializing and urbanizing society of today.
 

Prior to the creation of a Chinese empire by Qin Shi Huang, the Zhou Dynasty instituted a series of laws that defined the rights and obligations of the king, rulers of vassal states, high officials and the literati. However, the political situation was so unstable that little consideration was given towards formal law. From the Qin to the late Qing (221 B.C.-1840 A.D), the Chinese government divided Chinese people into four classes: landlord, peasant, craftsmen, and merchant. Landlords and peasants constituted the two major classes, while merchant and craftsmen were collected into the two minor. Theoretically, except for the position of the Emperor, nothing was hereditary.

During the 361 years of civil war after the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.D.), there was a partial restoration of feudalism when wealthy and powerful families emerged with large amounts of land and huge numbers of semi-serfs. They dominated important civilian and military positions of the government, making the positions available to members of their own families and clans. [Robert Mortimer Marsh, "Mandarins: The Circulation of Elites in China, 1600-1900", Ayer (June, 1980), hardcover, ISBN 0405-12981-5] [The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, 30] After the Tang Dynasty's emergence, the government extended the Imperial examination system as an attempt to eradicate this feudalism.

By the 1880s, China's population was between three hundred and fifty million and four hundred million, or about seventy million households. In Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, the industrial working class emerged in response to the greater usage of modern machines. Although the industrial revolution had created a blue-collar working class worldwide, it still remained a significant minority amongst China's working class, which mainly included traditional craftsmen and laborers. This meant that the majority of people remained peasant farmers. However, the small upper class changed dramatically. This was due in part to military reforms carried out in the late Qing. At the beginning of the Qing dynasty, the Manchu conquerors instituted the Eight Banners military system, which organized Han Chinese, Manchus, and Mongols into a bureaucratized military system that atrophied over time. In the nineteenth century, the Qing social system was challenged from within and without. Natural disasters and exorbitant taxes and levies led to peasant rebellions, most notably the Taiping Rebellion. Defeat at the hands of the British and French in the Opium Wars further demonstrated that China was weak militarily and the Eight Banners were not up to the challenge of maintaining order and defending the country.

During the 19th century, the military began a gradual restructuring that would theoretically enable it to fight rebels and foreign invaders alike. Generals Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, and Li Hongzhang became both field marshals and governors, instituting military schools throughout the provinces. In keeping with traditional practices, their associate generals inherited positions as provincial governors. In 1867, during a period of massive modernization of the educational system, the first naval academy was founded, and by 1910, national military exams were obsolete, as national military schools were institutionalized in the provinces. By 1911, seventy such schools existed. These military reforms helped to bring about the fall of the Qing dynasty. In the  late Qing, Yuan Shikai enacted a second generation of military leadership, and later Yuan Shikai was in office as the second president of the Republic of China. Before his death, Yuan Shikai opened a complex of six exemplary military schools at Baoding (a city a hundred miles south of Beijing), and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) was one of its graduates.

 

Social Structure in Modern China

 1911 to 1949

After 1911, China entered the Warlord Era. During this time, industrialization was slow to non-existent; between the years 1920 and 1949, the industrial sector had only increased by less than three million members, mainly women and children working in cotton mills. The main changes in social structure were military. In 1924, the Soviet Union helped Sun Yat-sen rebuild the Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT) military force, most notably through the training school at Huangpu, a small town near Guangzhou. Many military leaders of the following decades were Huangpu graduates, including Lin Biao, who later rose to fame with Mao. After the allied forces of the Kuomintang and the Communists reunified China, Chiang Kai-shek, with the help of underworld forces such as the Green Gang, attacked the Communists. This had the effect of suppressing labor unions.

1949 to 1976

After 1949, the revolutionaries became the ruling class. The Communist Party cadres became the new upper class. The misuse and manipulation of the ration system by members of the cadre class threatened to change them into a new class of privileged bureaucrats and technicians, mere descendants of the pre-revolutionary ruling class of cadre technocrats and selected representatives of the old proletariat. Whereas in the past, their position had been accessed primarily through acceptance to the best schools, now cadre status came to give them access to materials and options not fairly distributed amongst all. Housing had always been in demand in China, particularly in the larger cities, and cadres were protected from the intense competition for living space.In the countryside, the landlord class was eliminated during the land reform. In 1959, there were ten million state cadres, thirty-five million state workers, and two hundred million peasants. Chinese society was typical of agrarian societies because the peasant class composed the majority of the population.  

Following the implementation of land reforms, Mao instituted a process of collectivization in response to the a few selling of land by peasants to the new generation of rich landowners. Afraid of creating a new landlord class, Mao instituted a system of communes where land was supposed to be worked equally by peasants. His idea was to capitalize on the sheer number of peasants and effectively produce a surplus harvest that would help industrialization. This was known as the Great Leap Forward, which was a failure that resulted in the deaths of twenty to thirty million peasants. Just as farmers were put into communes, state workers were placed in large work units called Danweis (State-run enterprises). Since urban education reform was growing at a rate much faster than in rural areas, more and more workers were high school graduates. The slowing down of state industries and the increasing number of qualified middle class candidates contributed to the fact it became more and more difficult to obtain a position as a state worker. At this time, the Hukou system was implemented, which divided the population into urban and rural residents. This was done to make distribution of state services through State-run enterprises and communes easier, and to better organize the population in preparation for a possible invasion from the Soviet Union. The Hukou system made it illegal to migrate from the countryside to the city.

During the Cultural Revolution, the composition of society changed again. Schools were closed and many youth were sent to the countryside, putatively to learn from the peasants. Concern for peasants was reflected in the rural medical and educational services known as barefoot doctors and barefoot teachers. The life expectancy of peasants increased from less than forty years before 1949 to more than sixty years in the 1970s. At the same time, peasants were still the most illiterate, most powerless, and poorest social class. 

 After 1979

After the Reform and opening-up policy was implemented in the late 1970s, the Communist system Mao had instituted disintegrated in the face of economic development. In the countryside, communes disappeared by 1984. State-run enterprises began to lay off workers, "smashing the iron rice bowl" because of their expense and inefficiency. Although technically illegal under the Hukou household registration system, peasants began to look for jobs in cities and in other rural areas. Although state workers and urban collective workers did not decrease absolutely, their percentage dramatically decreased within the Chinese working class. In 1991, the number of the peasant workers was 113 million, surpassing the number of state workers. In 1993, the number of peasant workers was 145 million, almost equaling the combined numbers of state workers, urban collective workers, and urban non-state workers. As of 2006, there are 150 to 220 million peasant workers, also known as migrant workers or the floating population. Migrant workers have become the main body of the Chinese working class.

The huge growth of the floating population is due to the Reform and Opening policy. After 1979, capitalist-owned enterprises became responsible for most Chinese economic growth and job creation. There are several important reasons for the dramatic development of the non-state sector after 1979. First, before 1979, the Chinese economy was a shortage economy with a demand much higher than the supply. Second, after 1985, there was a huge amount of surplus rural labor. Third, there was a serious shortage of services in urban areas. Fourth, in 1978, Deng stopped Mao's policy of "up to the mountains and down to the countryside." A need was fulfilled by illegitimate private sectors willing to hire migrant workers, and the government made no move to stop it. Even with the systematic ignoring of the residence permit law, it is still a barrier to urbanization (urbanization lags 20% behind industrialization) it allows for discrimination against migrant workers. 

The Chinese Communist Party has adapted to this new system. From 1979 to 1993, the number of cadres increased from 18 million to 37 million. After 1993, the cadre class increased by several million members until finally reaching a plateau of 40 million due to the central government's actions to freeze membership. Cadres, party members, and state professionals have become the main body of the capitalist class. According to official statistics, in February 2003, 29.9% of capitalists were Communist Party Members. This is interesting in light of the fact that capitalists are now involved with between 70-85% of China's GDP. Despite this, there is tension between capitalists and the Communist state, most notably caused by taxes, lack of access to state bank loans, and the capitalist connection with the underworld. The capitalist class manages three-fourths to four-fifths of mainland China's GDP, but only pays one-third or less of aggregate taxes. The state enterprises pay the other two-thirds. Most capitalists successfully evade taxes, helped by local governments. In all the annual meetings of the national congress and national political consultative conference, capitalist legislators and representatives always complain about the difficulties in getting loans from state banks. Most of them said that during the process of their development they never got one cent in loans, and complained that in their localities the standard bribe for a loan is as high as 20 to 30% of the loan. China is still an industrializing agrarian society and has a long way to go to realize an industrial society, so the overwhelming majority of the people do not have access to the best of China's recent improvements. Most modern young adults in China do not go to college whose entrance is obtained by passing the College Entrance Examination, the standardized test at the end of the year. In the year 2000, less than 90 percent of the population finished junior high school, and less than 85 percent finished senior high or vocational school. As recently as 2000, only 80 percent of the population went to college.